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A popular example of the breakdown of generalizations in the common
law is Maine's famous dictum "from status to contract." This
prophecy has been fair game for the legal writers in England and
America." Juristic signs amply justify the criticism. Individualism
has been fighting a losing battle; the principle of laissez faire has
suffered from many invasions by courts and legislatures. To conserve
the freedom of individual action it has been necessary to limit it. This
paradox is not so startling as it seems when we attempt to infuse into
the legal order the realities of equality and liberty, and to counterbalance
the free play of economic forces. While we may commend the limita-
tion of Maine's generalization in the industrial and social relations of
our time, it is, however, the part of wisdom to avoid the danger of
substituting another concept which may be equally vulnerable. This
warning against the tendency of legal philosophers to generalize may
be emphasized in connection with the banishment of Maine's attempt to
plot out the future course of the common law.
Out of the death of Maine's formula "from status to contract"
there is beginning to appear a new generalization "from contract to
status." In their zeal to overthrow the theory that the evolution of law
is from status to contract, juristic writers are tending to construct
another principle of legal evolution and to claim for it a certain perma-
nency and validity in the solution of the legal problems of today and
tomorrow. Conceding that the recent movement in the law has been
from contract to status, is there any certainty that we have unearthed a
working principle which may be confidently applied without limitation
to the social and industrial disorders of our day and place? Recent
writings disclose a certain positive declaration that the progress of the
law from contract to status is something more enduring than a particu-
lar and a temporary standard of the common law; there is visible an
ambitious attempt to mould it into a fundamental mode of thought for
future use in the development of American law:
"There is no escaping the conclusion that certain doctrines and insti-
tutions of the law have inherent worth and validity.... This is true of
the conception of relation or status now coming back so prominently
into our law."'2
'"But in truth the dogma of Sir Henry Maine is a generalization from legal
history only .... it has no basis in Anglo-American legal history, and the whole
course of English and American law today is belying it, unless, indeed, we are
progressing backward." Pound, The Spirit of the Comnmon Law (1921) 28.
E. F. Albertsworth, From Contract to Status (1922) 42 CAN. L. T. io2;
Maine, Ancient Law (Pollock's ed. 19o6) Note L.
'E. F. Albertsworth, op. cit. supra note I, iii. Cf. Kocourek, The Legislative
Function, in Editorial Preface, Science of Legal Method (1917) 9 Mod. Leg.
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"The idea of relation and of legal consequences flowing therefrom
pervades every part of Anglo-American law.... If we cast aside the
Romanist prejudices of the nineteenth-century historical school, we may
perceive that in the idea of relation, in the characteristic common-law
mode of treating legal problems which we derived from the analogy of
the incidents of feudal tenure, we have an in~ititution of capital impor-
tance for the law of the future, a means of making our received legal
traditions a living force for justice in the society of today and of
tomorrow."
'3
It may be freely conceded that the swing of modern jurisprudence
has been from contract to status or relation. Dean Pound has clearly
demonstrated by many current examples that the feudal element has
played no small part in the shaping of the common law.4 A doubt
arises, however, when it is stated that "the conception of relation or
status" has "inherent worth and validity," and when it is predicted that
this feudal element of relation has curative qualities "of capital impor-
tance for the law of the future." In generalibus dolor latet. The fate
of Maine's dictum should warn us that there is danger in extending
particular standards beyond their proper spheres and developing them
into theories of general application. The universal picture, attempted
by the juristic philosopher, is often unconsciously colored by the bias and
prejudice of the time and place.5
In no branch of the common law have greater inroads been made
into Maine's dogma than in the industrial relation of employer and
employee. The contraction of the principle of laissez faire and the
expansion of legal control in the industrial order are indications of the
reception of the idea of relation and its utility as a legal conception.
New cases are arising which lend support to the contention that the
regulative conception of status or relation is received with approval and
Phil. Ser. xlii; Lord Shaw, The Widening Range of Law (1922) 47 A. B. A.
Rep. 222, 223; Korkunov, Tleory of Law (19o9 transl.) 4 Mod. Leg. Phil. Ser.
323-327.
The italics used throughout this paper are the present writer's.
'Pound, The End of Law as Developed it Juristic Thought (1917) 30 HARV. L.
Rrv. 2O, 213 and 221; See also, Pound, op. cit. supra note I, at p. 31.
While Professor Albertsworth uses the terms status and relation inter-
changeably, as indicative probably of a non-contractual idea, Dean Pound distin-
guishes the idea of relation from the idea of status. Ibid. 29, 30. "For status,"
he says, "is an archaic idea, quite out of line with modern ideas." Ibid 30.
The distinction taken is visible in the history of the common law. Pollock and
Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed. 1899) 407-417. It seems to have a
place in modern American law. "The very meaning of the word status, both
derivative and as defined in legal proceedings, forbids that it should be applied
to a mere relation. Status implies relation, but it is more than a mere relation."
De La Montanya v. De La Montanya (I896) 112 Calif. 1oi, 115, 44 Pac. 345, 348.
Cf. Barney v. Tourtellotte (1884) 138 Mass. io6, io8.
For the purposes of this paper, while the distinction is admitted, it is not
believed that it is material. Lack of volition and the non-contractual element
common to both status and relation, will be principally discussed.
' Pound, op. cit. supra note i, at pp. 22-31.
'Pound, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Law (1922) 16, 17, 19.
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is being applied by the courts.8 The principle of individualism, how-
ever, finds ardent supporters who protest against the abandonment of
freedom of contract in fixing wages and other terms of ekployment.7
Despite this tendency in the direction of relation, it is necessary to weigh
carefully the prediction that the future progress of industrial law will
be from contract to status; it may well be that a study of the present
labor problems will reveal limitations in the potential worth and practical
value of the conception of relation. It may be deemed expedient-for
the present time at least-to work out a compromise settlement with
the formula of Maine and to recognize that the spirit of individualism
in America has not suffered a complete defeat in its struggle with its
classical rivals in the common law.
The impending railroad labor problem offers an excellent and a fair
proving-ground for testing the universality and efficacy of the new
formula "from contract to status." In addition to the involved relation
of employer and employee, the predominance of the public interest and
the traditional treatment of public utilities in the common law argue
for the extension of the idea of relation in the settlement of railroad
labor disputes.8 It is natural to find that these factors have been
stressed by those who are advocating the relational idea of compulsory
arbitration of wages, rules and working conditions in railroad employ-
' United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co. (1922) 42 Sup. Ct. 570. In this
case the Supreme Court recognized the suability of an unincorporated association,
While the court reached its conclusion on the ground that federal legislation has
dealt with trade unions as legal entities, a fundamental reason for the extension
of the corporate feature to labor unions is that "out of the very necessities of the
existing conditions and the utter impossibility of doing justice otherwise, the
suable character of such an organization as this has come to be recognized in some
jurisdictions." Taft, C. J., at p. 575. Cf. St. Paul Typothetae vz. St. Paul Book-
binders' Unio; No. 37 (1905) 94 Minn. 351, 102 N. W. 725.
TChildrea's Hospital v. Adkins et al. (1922, D. C. App.) 284 Fed. 613. This
case declared the Minimum Wage Law for women, in the District of Columbia,
to be unconstitutional. "No greater calamity could befall the wage earners of
this country than to have the legislative power to fix wages upheld. It would
deprive them of the most sacred safeguard which the Constitution affords. Take
from the citizen the right to freely contract and sell his labor for the highest wage
which his individual skill and efficiency will command, and the laborer would be
reduced to an automaton-a mere creature of the State." Van Orsdel J., ibid. at
p. 623.
"Taking no account of legislative limitations upon freedom of contract, in the
purely judicial development of our law .... we have established that the duties of
public service companies are not contractual .... but are instead relational; they
do not flow from agreements which the public servant may make as he chooses,
they flow from the calling in which he has engaged and his consequent relation to
the public." Pound, (1921) op. cit. supra note I, at p. 29.
Compare the following extract by Thayer, Liability Without Fault (1916) 29
HARV. L. REv. 8or, 8o6: "This stringent liability of the carrier is iwt due to his
public calling, but to the nature of the agencies he uses, the helplessness of the
passengers, and the perils to life and limb."
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ment.9 The suggested legislative program involves the denial of the
right to strike by employees of the carriers, and the enactment of puni-
tive measures to enforce the rulings of the governmental wage board.
The practical importance and novelty of the anti-strike principle in
American law,"" and its possible extension to other industries," render
it imperative to examine the proposal to prohibit strikes in railroad
employment.
While the constitutionality of the proposed anti-strike remedy
presents many interesting and debatable problems which have been fre-
quently considered,' 2 the majority of the writers have passed the mechan-
ical aspects of the legislation. For our present purposes, the constitu-
tionality of this legislation may be conceded. The questions raised do
not involve the right or the power of Congress to pass this prohibitory
statute; they are mainly directed to the consideration of the limits of
effective legislative action. In a word, the problem is legislative, and
not judicial; the forum is the Congress of the United States, and not
U Professor Thompson's excellent article, Labor and the Law in the Public
Utility Field (1923) 21 MICH. L. Rav. i, should be consulted for a review of the
feudal idea of relation and an argument for its applicability to modern industrial
conditions in the field of public utilities. See note 12, infra.
0 In his Annual Address to Congress, December 8, 1922, President Harding
includes the anti-strike remedy as a part of the railroad program of Congress.
" The principle of the anti-strike has already been extended in Kansas. Mining,
manufacture of clothing, preparation of food products and all public utilities are
"declared to be affected with a public interest," and are under the. control of the
Kansas Court of Industrial Relations. Kansas, Special Session Laws, I92o, ch.
29, sec. 3 (a).
"If the whole industry of the manufacture or preparation of food products may
be enveloped in a public interest and regulated at will by the legislature, it need
not stop, as does this act [Kansas Industrial Act], with the process of converting
the products of the soil from a natural state to a condition to be used for food,
but it may reach back to the farmer, determine the conditions under which he shall
labor and employ others to work for him, the prices he may charge for his crops,
and the methods by which he may dispose of them." George W. Wickersham
(1920) Proc. N. H. Bar Ass'n, 315.
While the present paper deals primarily with the application of the principle of
compulsory service in railroad relations, it is submitted that the advocate of this
remedy cannot logically stop with this one public utility. If it has curative value
in solving the transportation problem, it must be applied, as in the Kansas Act, to
other industries charged with a public interest. While transportation is an essen-
tial ingredient in our social order, the industries producing food, fuel, and clothing
are just as important. If the principle of the anti-strike is extended to these
industries, the reductio ad absurduom of Mr. Wickersham is only a step away.
" See, for example, Parkinson, Constitutional Aspects of Compulsory Arbitra-
tot (1917) 7 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. No. i, p. 44; Ballantine, Railway Strikes and
the Constitution (1917) 17 Col. L. REV. 502; Turck, Peace on Public Utilities
(1922) 56 Am. L. REV. 56; Lowry, Strikes and the Law (1921) 21 Cot. L. REv.
783; Storey, The Right to Strike (1923) 32 YALE LAw JoURNAL, 99; Keefer,
Has a Person the Constitutional Right to Abstain from Work (1923) 29 W. VA.
L. QUART. 2o; C. 0. Fisher, Use of Federal Power in Settlement of Railway
Labor Disputes (1922) Bull. No. 303, Bureau of Labor Statistics, App'x A.
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the Supreme Court.1 3 It invites a study of the legislative function;
Anglo-American institutions and character; the policy of passing a
prohibitory law of this kind; its efficacy and enforceability; and the
timeliness of this legislation in view of the present development of
industrial law. This estimate of the probable results and consequences
of anti-strike legislation logically should be made before and not after
the passage of the suggested law.14
If the pure positivism of the historical school of jurisprudence is to
be condemned for its failure to view contemporaneous changes and its
blind acceptance of the past,' 5 the historical jurist may retort that the
modern legislator is frequently guilty of losing sight of the practical
value of utilizing the juristic experience of other times and other
places. 6 While the flux of things brings forth new legal problems,
peculiar to a given place, it is manifestly unwise to refuse to profit by
the experience of other governments in coping with similar emergen-
cies.1 7  The legislative function is not exhausted by the proof of the
power to pass a specific law; it must also include a definite and frank
consideration of the expediency of the given enactment, and its practica-
bility to meet and to solve the particular social or industrial evil which
it is intended to reach.'
" The distinction between the right of Congress to pass a given law and the
policy or wisdom of enacting it has been noted by the courts in many industrial
cases involving railroad labor.
"To an employee a wage law may be of more vital consequence, be of the very
essence of his life, involving factors-many and various-which he alone can
know and estimate, and which, besides, might not have an enduring constancy and
be submissive to a precedent judgment. There well might be hesitation to displace
him and substitute the determination of the law for his action. "I speak only of
intention; of the power I have no doubt." McKenna, J., in Wilson v. New (1917)
243 U. S. 332, 364, 37 Sup. Ct. 298, 308.
"Where there is, or generally is believed to be, an important ground of public
policy for restraint the court does not forbid it, whether this court agrees or disa-
grees with the policy pursued." Holmes, J., in Adair v. United States (ios)
2o8 U. S. 161, 191, 28 Sup. Ct. 277, 287, dissenting opinion.
" "If circumspection and caution are a part of wisdom, when we work only
upon inanimate matter, surely they become a part of duty too, when the subject
of our demolition and construction is not brick and timber, but sentient beings, by
the sudden alteration of whose state, condition, and habits, multitudes may be
rendered miserable." Edmund Burke, On the Revolution in France 1790, 24
Harvard Classics 317.
15 Leonhard, Methods Followed i; 'Germany by the Historical School of Law
(1907) 7 COL. L. REv. 573, 577.
"6 Nicholas M. Butler, Preliminary Education for Lawyers (1922) 47 A. B. A.
Rep. 278, 281; i Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence (1920)
128-134.
" W. Jethro Brown, Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation (5th ed. 1917)
233.
" "A much more difficult question than the question of constitutionality is the
question of policy which the legislature-assuming that it has the power to make
a suggested distinction-must consider in determining whether it is wise to do so."
W. A. Sutherland, The Menace of "Counter" Phrases (1922) 28 W. VA. L.
QUART. 179, 184; Jane Addams, Democracy and Social Ethics (19o2) 151.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
Law is a practical science. It recognizes that there are limitations of
effective legislative action. While this inability of the law to reach
out and control all forms of human activity is unfortunate, it is a condi-
tion which cannot be removed by the magic of a statute, and it must be
candidly recognized as a deterrent to the ambitious attempts of Congress
to control individual action. It is a trite statement, but it will be perti-
nent to keep it in mind at this time, that the life of a law is measured
in terms of its enforceability.' 9 Unfortunately, this legal truism is
frequently disregarded. The tendency of legislative bodies to attempt
a cure-all of social and economic upheavals by the passage of hasty and
ill-considered laws is a potent and a patent evil of the legal order. It
has had a thriving existence in America with its many legislative
bodies.2 0  The unwieldy size of the law-making groups, which has
necessitated the transfer of legislative business to committees, has
lessened the opportunity for a full and complete discussion of the merits
or demerits of a proposed law.2' While the number of legislators has
been increasing, it has been asserted that the statesmanship of these
enlarged assemblies has been lowered, a factor of importance in deter-
mining the resultant quality of legislative output.22  Popular clamor,
following national disorders which affect the social welfare, is imme-
diately reflected in the agitation for a new law to remove forever the
threatened security of society. The legislature responds to the insistent
demand, passes a law without a careful analysis of its efficacy or feasi-
bility, and the inevitable result is a postponement of the proper remedy,
or its gradual evolution in the light of the failure of the earlier
statutes.23  This symptom is visible in the current of legislation follow-
ing railroad strikes.24  It is true that "we have come to believe in
conscious lawmaking" and to realize that "legislation has for its
19Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action (1917) 3 A. B. A. Joutr 55.
" .. a legal rule without legal coercion is a contradiction in terms, a fire which
does not burn, a light that does not shine." Rudolf von Ihering, Der Zurck im
Recht (4te Aufl. 1903) transl. by Husik, under title Law as a ieans to an End
(1913) 241. Cf. Duff, Spinoza's Political and Ethical Philosophy (1903) 340;
Amos, Science of Law (1874) 30.
202 Bryce, The American Comnonwealth (Revised ed. I9XO) 593 et seq.
' Willoughby, The Nature of the State (1911) 158, I59; Roberts, The
Submerged Congressman, SAT. EvE. PosT, Oct. 21, 1922; .Kocourek, op. cit. supra
note 2.
""The legislative branch of our national government probably has never been
at a lower ebb than it is today." Sec. of War, John W. Weeks, Commencement
Address, Western Reserve University, June 15, 1922, N. Y. TIMES, June 16, 1922.
" Calvin Coolidge, The Limitations of Law (I922) 47 A. B. A. Rep. 270;
Parker, The Congestion of Law (i9o6) 29 ibid. 383, 387; on the psychology of
legislative justice, see Ross, Social Psychology (1908) 57; Le Bon, The Crowd
(1897) ch. 5, cited in Pound, Outlines of Lectures on Jurisprudence (3d ed. 192o)
76.
" C. 0. Fisher, op. cit. sapra note 12, 48, 76; see dissenting opinion of McKenna,
J. in Adair v. United States (i9o8) 2o8 U. S. 16I, 185, 28 Sup. Ct 277, 285.
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function to introduce new premises, ' 2 but it is the part of the legisla-
tive function to 'think through' a proposed law and to weigh it in the
scales of the environing circumstances.
The purpose behind the anti-strike law is entirely laudable; the
primacy of the public interest in the operation of the railroads is no
longer debatable. 28  The crux of the problem, however, is the determin-
ation of the most efficacious remedy to cure the interruption of train
service; the gravity of the situation does not forbid, but rather accen-
tuates, the importance of analyzing the practical utility of the given
legislative proposal.
American institutions are charged with an independence of individual
action. The Puritanical concept of liberty and the pioneering spirit
are interwoven into the fabric of our common law. 27 Individualism
has an important place in the daily life of the American. As one
English critic expresses it :28
"American individualism is not our English or Scottish individualism -
with its feudal or clannish restrictions of caste and class.... It is very
broad and deep, this American individualism, and has been the secret
of American achievement from first to last, whether in the realms of
war or peaceful progress."
These institutions and laws are not mere accidents; they are the direct
reflections of the character, customs, traits, and spirit of the people.
While it may be urged that these characteristics of laws and men obsti-
nately and unfortunately persist in our social order, the probable success
"Pound, op. cit. supra note I, 173-176.
" "The freedom of action on the part of workmen and on the part of employers
does not measure in importance with that of public welfare and national security."
Address of President Harding to the coal operators, July 18, 1922. Cf. W. S.
Carter, Pres. of Broth. of Locomotive Firemen; "Whenever a nation reaches that
point where public convenience is used to suppress the individual rights of the
people, then that nation has reached its zenith, is on the downward path." The
Objections of Labor to Compadsory Arbitration (1917) 7 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci.
36, 42.
'" It is important to note, as indicative of the pronounced strength of our indi-
vidualism, that of the seven factors which, Dean Pound says, "have contributed to
shape our American common law .... all but one of these made strongly for
individualism.... ." Op. cit. supra note 1, 14, 15.
While this single factor, happily called "the feudal element!' by Dean Pound,
has demonstrated its utility and adaptability in the industrial society of our day,
it may be doubted whether this numerical and weighted supremacy of individualism
in our law is ready to withdraw completely from the juristic leadership in the
American common law in favor of its more ancient rival. Although the feudal
law "has given to our legal system a fundamental mode of thought" which has
been an invaluable aid to the courts, its further extension cannot be invoked solely
on account of the respectability which goes with age; it must prove its worth as
a workable solution of concrete problems of the time and place. Cf. Pound,
Judge Hohnes's Contribution to the Science of Law (1921) 34 HARv. L. REv. 449.Lt. Col. Chas. A. Repington, WAsHIaNGToN TImEs, Nov. ig, 1922. For a
recent analysis of the importance of individualism in American life, see Herbert
Hoover, American Individualin (1922).
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of a law, which cuts across these deeply-rooted national inclinations,
must be measured by conditions as we find them. And the alleged
failing of stubborn resistance does not lessen the difficulties, which the
legislative fiat must remove.29
As a practical matter, it may be seriously questioned whether this
background provides the proper setting for this repressive industrial
law.30 This doubt about the efficacy of laws to prohibit strikes has
been expressed not only by labor officials, 31 but also by non-partisan
juristic writers,3 2 publicists,38 and others.34  It is noteworthy that there
is a counter-movement in industry, which is in spirit and purpose the
antithesis of this policy of compulsion. Its primary purpose is to
""The American will sacrifice any amount of money, undergo any privation or
suffering, put forth any effort, for his beliefs." Nicholas M. Butler, The Ameri-
can As He Is (19o8) 41.
""The whole atmosphere of our country, with its aggressiveness and indivi-
dualism, coupled with their exploitation, tends to arouse these workers to demon-
strate in blind, eager and intense ways that they are not pack-animals but human
beings." Tead, Instincts In Indutstry (igi) 89, 90.
"What lifts the bristles of man is, however, external pressure. He kicks
against the pricks, whipping makes him balk .... The passion for liberty, then,
limits that social interference which calls for pressure." Ross, Social Control
(I9O) 420.
'Samuel Gompers, Testimony Before Senate Coin. on Manufactures, Feb. 9,
IO, 1921; W. S. Carter, op. cit. supra note 26.
S". .. .it may be questioned whether, purely as a matter of expediency, it is
wise to attempt to prohibit strikes; whether coercion or persuasion is the best
way to the avoidance of those clashes of interest which involve the public in so
much loss and annoyance." George W. Wickersham (192o) Proc. N. H. Bar
Ass'n. 313.
"There can be no perfect control of personal conduct by legislation. Its attempt
must be accompanied with the full expectation of very many failures. The
problem of preventing vice and crime, and of restraining personal and organized
selfishness is as old as human experience. We shall not find for it an immiediate
and complete solution in an amnendment to the federal Constitution, an act of
Congress, or in the findings of a new board or coininsssion. There is no magic
in government, not possessed by the people at large, by which these things can be
done." Calvin Coolidge, Vice-President of the United States, op. cit. supra note
23, at p. 275.
"How impolitic are all laws that proceed only by prohibitions! We must fight
human nature with itself 1" Kohler, Lehrbach der Rechtsphilosophie (igog)
transl. by Albrecht, Philosophy of Law (1914) 141.
""The time and occasion has not yet arrived when the principle of compulsory
arbitration should be attempted by legislative enactment Indeed it is subject to
grave doubt as to whether compulsory arbitration will accomplish the ptrpose of
its enactment. It is not yet claimed, even by the advocates of compulsory mediation
in those countries where it has been adopted, that it is the solution of the problem."
William L. Chambers, U. S. Comm'r of Mediation, (917) 7 Proc. Acad. Pol.
Sci. Part I, 8; Hilaire Belloc, The Servile State (I912) 176.
"W. S. Jevons, The State in Relation to Labour (4th ed. i9io) 23; John A.
Fitch, Industrial Peace by Law--the Kansas Way (920) 44 SURvEY, 7; Samuel
Untermyer, How Labor May Lead (Jan. 1923) COLUMBIA, 5; Duff, op. cit. supra
note 19, 342-345.
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humanize the labor phases of industrial activities by releasing the crea-
tional and co~perative impulses of the workers. Labor copartnership
is a definite expression of the innate individualism of the workers and
an honest endeavor to carry it into practice in the regulation of the rela-
tions of the employer and employee.3 5 This democratization of
industry is not academic; it is being successfully used in many indus-
trial plants.3 6 Its application has been suggested in the solution of the
railroad labor problem,3 7 and has been indorsed by eminent capitalists.38
The churches have advocated its adoption as an essential in industrial
reconstruction.3 9 This growing liberalization in the industrial order,
and its striking exemplification of the spirit of American institutions, is
in marked contrast with the formula which seeks to attain industrial
peace by repression and force.
Although invasions have been made into the freedom of individual
action, and further encroachments are inevitable, this cross-section of
the American character and institutions indicates-at this time at least-
an appreciable opposition to the principle of compulsory service in the
industrial order. In this conflict between the common-law ideas of
relation or status and the current emphasis in American law upon
individualism and self-assertion, it is not quite clear that the American
public is ready to pass from the "Scylla of laissez faire" to the
"Charybdis of excessive public regulation." 40
The principal objective of legislation to prohibit strikes is the insur-
ance of continuous transportation. Its advocacy is prefaced by a
forcible and proper assertion of the priority of the rights of the public.
The commendable end, however, of a legal regulation is not a guarantee
of its efficacy or enforceability. 41  We may learn this lesson from
courts of equity, which refuse their aid to enforce contracts of personal
" Magruder, Labor Copartnership in Inditry (1922) 35 HARV. L. REv. 912;
Tufts, Judicial Law-Making Exemplified in Itdustrial Arbitration (1921) 21
COL. L. REv. 405; Howard, Developwnt of Government in Industry (1916) io
ILL. L. REv. 567; Lauck and Watts, The Industrial Code (1922) ch. 12.
'John Leitch, Man to Man (1919). The articles cited in note 35, supra, deal
with the practical operation of labor copartnership in industrial plants.
'James 0. Fagan, Labor and the Railroads (igog) 1O3, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
145, 152; Testimony of Henry T. Hunt, former member of Railroad Labor
Board, 4 Hearings before the Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, on Railroad
Revenues and Expenses, 1874 et seq., Jan. 25, ,922.
""I believe the most potent measure in bringing about industrial harmony and
prosperity is adequate representation of the parties in interest.. . . I believe that
the most effective structure of representation is that which is built from the
bottom up, which includes all employees. . . ." John D. Rockefeller, Jr., Address
before War Emergency Conference, cited in Cohen, An American Labor Policy
(1919) I8.
"The pronouncements of the churches as to industrial reconstruction are
collected in Lauck and Watts, op. cit. supra note 35, App'x X.
'W. Jethro Brown, Law, Industry and Post-War Adjustments (1922) 35
HARv. L. REv. 223, 231.
Pound, op. cit. supra note ig; Coolidge, op. cit. supra note 23.
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service.4 2  The reluctance of equity to decree specific performance of
labor contracts can hardly be attributed to a lack of sympathy with the
merits of the case; it seems to rest squarely upon the mechanical
difficulty of enforcing its decrees.43  If equity has refused to issue
mandatory orders against individuals on account of the practical objec-
tion of non-enforceability, the same concrete impracticability, immeasur-
ably magnified, confronts the advocate of compulsory service in rail-
road employment. Passing the peculiarly involved and isolated acts of
railroad employees engaged in the movement of trains, a fact which
complicates the feasibility of the equitable process, it may be asked
whether the attempt is not against public policy.44
It is true that other legal remedies are available. The imposition of
"disagreeable consequences," in the form of imprisonment of the
strikers, has been proposed as a workable substitute for equitable
relief. 45  Adhering to the mechanical aspects of this proposal, it does
Lonley v. Wagner (1852, CI.) i De Gex, M. and G. 604; Fry, Specific
Performance (6th ed. 1921) sec. 112; Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.
1919) see. 1343.
4"The rule, we think, is without exception that equity will not compel the
actual, affirmative performance by an employee of merely personal services, any
more than it will compel an employer to retain in his personal service one who,
no matter for what the cause, is not acceptable to him for service of that charac-
ter. . . . Relief of that character has always been regarded as impracticable."
Arthur v. Oakes (1894, C. C. A. 7th) 63 Fed. 3IO, 318. See also, Toledo, A. A.
& N. M. Ry. v. Penn. Ry. (1893, C. C. N. D,. Ohio) 54 Fed. 730. Cf. Ex parte
Lenwn (1897) 166 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 658.
The contrary view as to the enforceability of a contract for personal service
seems to be maintained in Thompson, op. cit. supra note 9, 21, 22. He cites
Ex parte Lennon to sustain this contention. Sed qzuwere. The court distinctly
stated that "the question whether the court has the power to compel performance
of a personal contract does not arise." The statement of the learned writer that
the decision rested upon a failure of the employee, Lennon, to exercise "his consti-
tutional right to permanently retire from the (railroad) service" does not seem
to be justified by a reading of the case. The decision of the court is placed on
the finding of the lower court that Lennon had not retired, temporarily or perma-
nently, from the service of the company; that he was at the time of the disobe-
dience of the injunction in the employ of the railroad, and, therefore, bound to
obey the injunction.
1 "It would be impracticable to enforce the relation of master and servant
against the will of either. Especially is this true in the case of railway engineers,
where nothing but the most painstaking and devoted attention on the part of the
employee will secure a proper discharge of his responsible duties; and it would even
seem to be against public policy to expose the lives of the traveling public to the
danger which might arise from the enforced and unwilling performance of so
delicate a service." Taft, J. Toledo, etc. Co. v. Penn. Ry. supra note 43.
"It is, however, practicable, if legal, to induce performance by attaching disa-
greeable consequences to the breach of service contract. Such breaches of contract
have always involved liability on the part of the defaulting contractor to respond
in damages for the injury done to the other contracting party." Parkinson, op. cit.
supra note 12, at p. 45.
The alleged parallel between the commercial contract and the service contradt
fails to cover the many strikes which take place when there is no contract or, at
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not clear away the noted difficulties underlying specific performance.
If imprisonment were the penalty for an infraction of the compulsory
statute, and a concerted strike occurred, the confinement of the offend-
ers would match the task of Sisyphus. And the possible success of
the exercise of the police power presents the paradox of the necessary
suspension of train service, intensifying the very disaster which the
anti-strike law is intended to prevent.48 The levy of fines, against the
union or its members, is free from the tangible obstacle of lack of
judicial power. While the procedural difficulty of reaching the funds
of the national unions seems to be disappearing,47 the question remains
whether its use will accomplish the main purpose, namely, the continu-
ance of the operation of the trains. The levy of fines against individual
members is hardly practicable. as a preventive. Conservation of the
funds in the union treasury, admittedly a matter of importance to the
officials, would frequently be lost sight of by the members. Outlaw
strikes are not uncommon; and the unauthorized strike presents the
additional complication that the funds of the national union could not
be attached.4 1 If the powers of a court of equity, with its flexible
decrees, are inadequate to insure the continuity of train service, the
return to the common-law judgment is not likely to be a workable alter-
native. Equitable relief is usually sought when the common-law
remedy is inadequate. The proposed substitution of a fine for specific
performance contains the anomalous turn-about-face: legal relief is to
be sought when the equitable remedy is inadequate.
Comparative legislation has its function in enabling the legislator to
profit by the experience of other places in dealing with similar problems.
The comparative method, it may be said, merits cautious treatment and
the candid admission that the success or failure of a given law must
best, a contract at will. Under these circumstances there is no breach of contract
and no contractual liability to respond in damages. The real, question involved in
this situation is not contractual, but relational. It presents the problem whether,
in the absence of a contract to work, the employees may be compelled to continue
their services. See COMMENTS (1923) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, i6o, 161.
If there is a service contract which is broken by the employee's refusing to
work, there is, of course, a remedy for breach of the service contract without any
additional legislation. Schlesinger v. Quinto (1922, N. Y. Sup. Ct.) 117 Misc.
735; Nederlandsch Ainerikaatusche Stoomvaart Maatschappij v. Stevedores' &
Longshoretwn's Benevolent Society (i92o, E. D. La.) 265 Fed. 397.
'"Let us suppose that 2,oooooo men should at the same time and by common
agreement all quit their work at the stroke of the clock. What are you going to
do with them-put them in jail? When you did, when the last railroader is in
jail, who would run your railroads?" Senator A. 0. Stanley, Speech in the
Senate, December I6, 1919. 59 Cong. Rec. Part I, 672.
', United Mineworkers v. Coronado Coal Co. supra note 6.
""A corporation is responsible for the wrongs committed by its agents in the
course of its business.... But it must be shown that it is in the business of the
corporation. Surely no stricter rule can be enforced against an unincorporated
association like this." United Miteworkers v. Coronado Coal Co. supra, note 6,
at pp. 577-578.
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be tempered by the place and the people that gave it birth. This reser-
vation is peculiarly appropriate in the analysis of labor laws; racial
characteristics and national traits cannot be eliminated in gauging the'
results of the legislative experiments. The most recent examples of
compulsory service enactments are found in Australia, 4  South
Australia,5" and Kansas.51 The Australian Court has been fortunate in
the selection of an able jurist to preside over the destinies of the court
during its formative period. The carefully enunciated opinions of Mr.
Justice Higgins disclose an endeavor to build up a traditional body of
principles,5 2 and indicate the true judicial approach to the solution of
an intrinsically complex problem. In South Australia, Mr. Justice
Brown has brought to his judicial office a similar effort to develop
standards and precedents in industrial cases. Despite the unquestioned
integrity and ability of the justices,53 the Australasian legislation has
failed to end strikes. 4 Two principal methods of enforcement,
fines and imprisonment, have not had the intended effect.5 5 The
Australasian experiments hardly convey the assurance that the idea of
compulsory service can be expanded to meet the greatly enlarged area
of railroad activities in this country.
The propinquity of the Kansas attempt to reach industrial peace
makes it especially interesting and important to the American public.
The trial is being conducted upon most fertile ground for the germina-
tion of the idea of compulsion as an industrial solvent. Kansas is an
agricultural state; its industries, including mining, are of minor impor-
tance. Despite this overwhelming majority of the 'party of the third
part,' three major labor disorders, the mine strike, the packers' and the
shopmen's strikes, have occurred since the passage of the law. No
appreciable effort was made to apply the repressive provisions of the
Kansas law, although the violation of the law by the strikers seems to
have been unquestionable. 0 The failure of the court to set the
4' Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1904-1921.
South Australia, Industrial Arbitration Act, 1912.
"Kan. Special Session Laws, 192o, ch. 29; see note ii, supra.
' Read, for example his opinion on "the basic wage," Anglise v. Australian
Meat Industry Employees' Union (1916) IO Com. Arb. Rep. 465; Sayre, Cases
on Labor Law (1922) 89o; and his discussion of "the minimum wage," The
Australian Boot Trade Employees' Fed. vi. Whybrow & Co. (1910) 4 Com. Arb.
Rep. i, Sayre, op. cit. 883.
Compare the success of Commissioner Neill and Judge Knapp, in railroad
labor arbitration cases, under the Erdman Act, as an indication of the supreme
importance of the personnel of industrial courts and boards. C. 0. Fisher, op. cit.
supra note 12, 34.
' M. B. Hammond, Compulsory Arbitration in Australia and New Zealand
(1917) 7 Proc. Acad. Pol. Sci. No. i, p. 27; 'William Z. Ripley, To Prevent
Indutstrial War (1916) 7 NEW REtmLIc, 12.
Sir Lynden Macassey, The Industrial Courts Act, 1919 (1920) 2 Joui. CoMP.
LEG. (3d ser.) part i, 72.
' Sec. 17. ". . . . it shall be unlawful for any such individual employee or
other person to conspire with other persons to quit their employment or to induce
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machinery of the law in motion against the strikers must be deemed a
silent admission of inability to compel individual service."' The brevity
of the ambitious, but consistent, attempt to extend the anti-strike
principle to all industries charged with a public interest prevents any
positive prediction as to the final outcome of the Kansas program, 8 but
it is safe to say that it has not given evidence to date of reducing the
dangers of strikes by means of legislative mandate or forced labor.
Even conceding the efficacy of the anti-strike Iaw and its power to
compel personal service, a major consideration faces the legislator in
the attempt to introduce law and order into the settlement of railroad
labor disputes. Have we developed juristic methods which warrant
the passage of this law? 59 Has our industrial law progressed to the
point where we may assure the employee in railroad service a workable
substitute for the strike, surrounded by the safeguards and guarantees
which we associate with the administration of justice in the legal order?
In this connection, it is eminently proper to emphasize that performance,
and not mere promise, of jural adjudication is required.. This prelimin-
ary insurance of the establishment of legal machinery is imperative and
its importance is fairly recognized by those who contend for the substi-
tution of wage-fixing by judicial order and the withdrawal of the strike
other persons to quit their employment for the purpose of hindering, delaying,
interfering with, or suspending the operation of any of the industries, employ-
ments, public utilities, or common carriers governed by the provisions of the act.
Sec. 18. "Any person willfully violating the provisions of this act, .... shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof in any court of
competent jurisdiction of this state shall be punished by a fine of not to exceed$1,ooo, or by imprisonment in the county jail of not to exceed one year, or by both
such fine and imprisonment. .. ." Kan. Special Session Laws, 192o, ch. 29.
" This failure of the Industrial Court to prosecute the strikers for violations
of the anti-strike clauses of the act, in the more important industrial controversies,
is the more remarkable in view of the manner in which the court has construed
the contention of Mr. Justice Huggins,-the author of the act and the presidingjudge of the Industrial Court-that "the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations does not attach except in case of an emergency which threatens the
public peace or the public health"; see Huggins, Fundamentals of the Kansas
Industrial Court Act (1921) 7 A. B. A. JoutL 265, 267.
For example, see Court of Industrial Relations v. Charles Wolff Co. (1922,
Kan.) 2o7 Pac. 8o6, where the court assumed jurisdiction in a wage dispute
between the defendant and 30o employees. In this case it was admitted by the
majority that "the defendant's plant is a small one, and it may be admitted that,
if it should cease to operate, the effect on the supply of meat and food in this
state would not greatly inconvenience the people of Kansas." Cf. the strong
dissent by Burch, J., in this case.
' The results of the Kansas Law to date are considered in Smith, Practical
Operation of Kansas Industrial Law (1922) 8 A. B. A. Joua. 68o. For a bibli-
ography of the Kansas Industrial Court Law, see Phelps, University Debaters'
Manual (1921-1922) 48-51.
' "The legislator does not create the law arbitrarily. He has no power to make
rules which are not prepared for by the march of social progress. Legislation
passed in any other way remains a dead letter and totally unapplied." Korkunov,
op. cit. supra note 2, 404.
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as the only economic weapon of labor.60 Although "the inalienable
right to strike" has been frequently denied as a 'counter' phrase, which
has wrought havoc in the social order,6 ' it has a definite place in the
vocabulary of the worker in the present industrial system until there is
erected a legal substitute in its place.
There are many indications of the gradual unfolding of a distinct
branch of the law under the euphonious title of Industrial Jurispru-
dence.6 2  Legislatures and courts have gone far in shaping and defining
the relations of employer and employee. But the particular phase of
wages and working conditions is still in the stage of primitive law.
The give-and-take principle prevails; the main objective is peace and
the bargaining power of the contestants fixes the price.68  This vacuum
' "Sponsoring the railroads as we do, it is an obligation that labor shall be
assured the highest justice and every proper consideration of wage and working
conditions ... " Address of President Harding to the Congress, December 8,
1922.
Senator Cummins, an ardent advocate of the anti-strike law and co-author of
the Transportation Act, 192o, said: "I do not believe that the right to strike
should be taken away from the employees without substituting something better."
Speech in the Senate, December 4, 1919, 59 Cong. Rec. Part I, p. 146; See also
T. S. Adams, Labor Problems (9o5) 205.
' "On analysis, however, this phrase (the inalienable right to strike) will be
seen to confuse the constitutional right actually and bon fide to retire on reason-
able terms from a particular service or vocation with the alleged right to strike.
In fact the strike is quite a different thing. It is an abrupt, arbitrary and con-
certed cessation of work, not for the purpose of quitting the employment, but
obviously and admittedly with the definite object of continuing in that very
employment upon the strikers' own terms." Thompson, op. cit. supra note 9,
at p. 21.
If the learned writer means that this distinction between "the constitutional
right to retire" and "the alleged right to strike" is generally taken by the
courts, it is believed that he is in error. A general denial of "the right to strike,"
accepting the author's specification of the purposes 'back of the strike, is not
apparent in the decisions of the courts. American Steel Foundries % Tri-City
Cent. Trade Council (1921) 257 U. S. 184, 209, 42 Sup. Ct. 72, 78; Parkinson
Co. v. Building Trades Council (198o) 154 Calif. 581, 98 Pac. 1O27; De Minlico v.
Craig (191) 207 Mass. 593, 94 N. E. 317; Martin, Law of Labor Unions (igio)
sec. 27, 28. The vigorous criticism by the writer of the case of In re Claim of
Employees of the Minneapolis Steel & Machine Company (1920) 6 War Depart-
ment, Decisions, Contract Adjustment Board, 835 may be heartily indorsed on the
ground that the threatened strike was "in violation of an existing wage agree-
ment" and that it was an "unconscionable and disloyal exercise" of the power
to strike in time of war. The case, however, is hardly a suitable premise for the
conclusion that the "alleged right to strike" does not exist at all.
A similar statement is made in Storey, The Right to Strike (922) 32 YALE
LAW JOURNAL, 99, 102. For a criticism of the same, see COMM.,ENTS (1922) 32
ibid. 16o.
'Morris L. Ernest, The Develotnnent of Industrial .Jurisprudence (1921) 21
CoL. L. REv. 567. The solidification of industrial law is concretely evidenced by
the appearance of legal treaties upon the subject. See, for instance, Martin, Law
of Labor Unions (igio) ; and Sayre, Cases on Labor Law (1922).
I Pound, Address in (1917) Proc. N. H. Bar Ass'n. 6.
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of principles must be dealt with as an integral part of the labor problem;
it must be regarded as a tangible difficulty in the balancing of the
interests of the parties.6 4
Juridical empiricism and adherence to rules and standards are clearly
marked tendencies of the common law.65 It is not too much to expect
that the entrance of government into industry must be paralleled by the
development of "predetermined premises" proceeding along a "known
technique" and "fixed lines." This does not mean that the legislature
should attempt the impossible by the "premature crystallization of
principles" as Mr. Justice Higgins expresses it16 with its resultant
danger of the erasure of all flexibility in the application of the law. It
does mean that it betrays a comfortable optimism to create a wage board
with arbitrary power to fix wages without principles or standards to
guide or control it, and to point to the erection of the wage board as a
complete and entire satisfaction of the employees' claims to a legal
machine and legal methods in the determination of wages, rules, 4nd
working conditions.
It is, therefore, in order to glance at the three available methods for
settling railroad labor controversies, and to view them with respect to
the presence of juristic methods. These three prevalent modes of
settlement are: first, settlement by force, that is, by the strike or
lockout; secondly, settlement by voluntary arbitration; and thirdly,
settlement by a permanent government board with mandatory powers
over the litigants and authority to fix wages, rules, and working condi-
tions. The use of the strike or lockout, needless to say, amounts to
virtual warfare in which the only visible principle is that might makes
right. Voluntary arbitration in practice has involved the same lack of
principle; it is invoked to protect the public and the merits of the
" "Ninety per cent of the industrial disputes which occur, do occur simplybecause neither side knows what principle should be applied. Where there are no
principles-tot hiomines, quot sententiae and strikes." Sir Lynden Macassey,
op. cit. suepra note 55.
Pound, op. cit. supra note I, 18i, 182. "It would be most unfortunate if bothlegislature and court should be governed by a conception of law as will and proceed
to lay down whatever seemed best, for that reason alone, unrestrained by the
necessity of going upon predetermined premises or developing them by a known
technique and along fixed lines. The chief success of our common law doctrine
of precedent is that it combines certainty and power of growth as no other doctrine
has been able to do."
The growth of equity and the fusion of natural law and morals, as examples
of the conscious moulding of the common law along flexible lines, guided onlyby the conscience of the individual judge, are not in point in the present stage
of industrial controversies. These methods, invoked to ease and to soften the
rigidity of the common law, followed the age of strict law, with its fully developed,
though unyielding, principles and formalism. They were appendages, engrafted
upon, and liter absorbed by, the common law. See Pound, Ibid 140-143; op. cit.
supra note 5, IO8-i2o.
The Printing Trades Case (I918) 2 So. Aust Ind. Rep. 31; Sayre, op. cit.
supra note 52, 905, 917.
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controversy or the rights of the parties are submerged in the interest
of the public. This defect has been plainly apparent in the use of
arbitration in railroad labor disputes.6 7  The case against the adequacy
of the legal methods of the stage of voluntary arbitration has been
summed up by a recent writer :68
"Until a system of basic assumptions carefully defining a 'fair wage,'
'proper working conditions,' 'a fair day's work,' and the like is erected,
which can fill the place in these bodies the common law fills in ordinary
courts, arbitration will remain in the stage of primitive law with the
resultant danger that the judges themselves, in their zeal to define
principles under which they are to work, will build up for themselves a
system of fixed principles leading to the unfortunate result of a stage
of strict law."
It is true that the era of voluntary arbitration is a long step in advance
of the strife and discord of strikes and lockouts, but it does not appear
to have progressed very far beyond the primitive law in the definition
of jural material. Its primary rule has been settlement at any price
"with the State as the keeper of the lists."' 69
The final stage in the adjudication of railroad wages is reached with
the advent of the Railroad Labor Board created by the Transportation
Act, 1920.70 It marks the definite, and probably the permanent, estab-
' "A valid objection to this kind of settlement (voluntary arbitration under the'
Erdman Act) is that it is based on what seems to be the easier plan rather than
on the merits of the controversy; expediency rather than justice is the ultimate
standard or basis for settlement." C. 0. Fisher, op. cit. supra note 12, at p. 35.
"But it (Newlands Act) has failed utterly to meet the needs of the case ...
Piecemeal adjustment-an unsatisfactory compromise-rather than a fundamental
determination of the merits of the dispute resulted." W. Z. Ripley, The Railroad
Eight Hour Law (1916) AmER. Rv. OF Rv's., Vol. LIV, 392. See also, to the
same effect, Commons, Arbitration, Conciliation and Trade Agreement (1904) 56
IND. 1440; J. N. Stockett, Jr. (1918) The Arbitral Determination of Railway
Wages, xx.
' Carl I. Wheat, Awri can Legislation for the Adjistment of Intdustrial Disputes
(1921) 27 W. VA. L. QuART. 43, 65.
Although the suggested evil of a stage of strict law may emanate out of the
failure by the legislature to formulate a "system of basic assumptions," there is
another equally dangerous possibility. If the wage-fixing tribunal is given general
powers, it is likely to function in a haphazard way without any definition of "the
principles under which they are to work," resulting in a spurious form of equi-
table procedure. To pass abruptly from the stage of primitive law to a premature
stage of equity, wherein the cases are determined by the unrestrained action of an
industrial wage board, as, if anything, more dangerous than the stage of strict law.
It opens the door to the prejudices, impulses and bias of the members of the
board-defects always pbtentially present in the "arbitrium judicis."
' W. Jethro Brown, Underlying Principles of Modern Legislation. (5th ed. 1917)
io6.
"Act of Feb. 28, 192o, Title 3, 41 Stat at L. 456, 469 et seq. The Railroad
Labor Board is composed of nine members, three representing labor, three repre-
senting the management and three, the public. The labor and management groups
are appointed by the President from a list of six nominees, selected by the
employees and the management of the carriers respectively. Local boards of
adjustment are permitted, but are not required, with a right of appeal therefrom
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lishment of a government tribunal with wage-fixing powers and the
right to compel the parties to submit their disputes to the Railroad
Labor Board, where the dispute is likely to interrupt appreciably the
movement of trains. The designation of the Railroad Labor Board
has been heralded as the beginning of a new era in the adjustment of
the relations of the carriers and their employees.7 1  It has been regarded
as an agency which removes the strike as a necessary weapon for rail-
road labor72  The Railroad Labor Board is now in its third year of
existence-at least long enough to permit a preliminary examination of
its policies and accomplishments-and its results may be estimated by a
brief study of its major decisions.
The question of immediate interest is: Has the Railroad Labor Board
supplied the lack of norms and standards which existed prior to its
origin? Has the promise of a legal order, which accompanied its
creation, been translated into performance? The following extract
from the Transportation Act furnishes a basis for the consideration of
the interrogation:
Section 307 (d) .... In determining the justness and reasonable-
ness of such wages and salaries or working conditions the Board shall,
so far as applicable, take into consideration among other relevant
circumstances:
(i) The scale of wages paid for similar kinds of work in other
industries;
(2) The relation between wages and the cost of living;
(3) The hazards of employment;
(4) The training and skill required;
(5) The degree of responsibility;
(6) The character and regularity of employment;(7) Inequalities of increases in wages and treatment, the result
of previous wage orders or adjustments.
A reading of this section indicates that Congress was not only leaving
to the Railroad Labor Board the usual degree of discretion, which is
found in statutes creating administrative boards,7 but was in fact giving
to the Board the responsibility and duty of shaping and defining the
to the Railroad Labor Board. The latter is given the power to order the parties
to any dispute, which is likely to substantially interrupt commerce, to appear before
it. The Board is authorized to hear and to decide any dispute involving grievances,
rules, working conditions and wages. The Act contains no penalties for the
violation of its orders. Cf. Pennsylvania Ry. v. United States Labor Board
(Feb. 19, 1923) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. T. 1922, No. 585, at pp. 6, 7, 10, II.
C. 0. Fisher, op. cit. supra note 12, at p. 95.
Thompson, op. cit. supra note 9, at p. 28.
"In my opinion the (Railroad) Labor Board is a body corporate, subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal courts, and may sue and be sued. This does not mean,
however, that the courts have general authority over the exercise of a discretion
vested in an administrative body or officer." Page J., Pennsylvania Ry. v. United
States Railroad Labor Board et al. (1922, N. D. Ill.) 282 Fed. 693, 694; E. F.
Albertsworth, Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1922) 35 HARv. L. REv.
127; Cuthbert Pound, The Judicial Power (1922) 35 ibid. 187.
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scope of the enunciated assumptions. The stated factors were to be
taken into "consideration" by the Board "so far as applicable," and
could be rejected as inapplicable after "consideration," or. at least
subdued in the light of the evanescent clause "other relevant circum-
stances.'74  The flexibility of this latt& provision in circumscribing
the powers of the Labor Board was noted in the minority opinion of
Decision No. lO74 (June IO, 1922):
"Attention should be called to the readiness to go afield under the
broad provision "other relevant circumstances" to justify wage cutting,
and the equally assiduous search for a means of qualifying the specific
cost-of-living principle mentioned. The net result has been to interpret
out of the law the clause relative to the cost of living, and to read into
the law new bases probably never contemplated by those responsible for
its passage."
If the definition of specific principles or standards by Congress is a
prerequisite to the orderly determination of wages by a government
board, it is difficult to trace these certain norms out of the language of
the Transportation Act.
Confronted with this evasive do-what-is-right mandate, it was neces-
sary for the Railroad Labor Board to attempt to fashion these principles
as it went along. In the first general wage case, Decision No. 2 (July
20, 1920), we find a frank admission that "the Board has been unable
to find any formula which, applied to the facts, would work out a just
and reasonable wage for the many thousands of positions involved in
this dispute." In this dilemma "it was necessary to adopt," as a base
upon which to erect the new wage scale, the existing schedules of wages
established under the authority of the United States Railroad Adminis-
tration. This wartime scale, passed to meet the exigencies of the
moment, could not in the nature of things be any more than a temporary
makeshift.7 5  It could hardly have been the intention of Congress that
the Railroad Labor Board should build permanently on this formula.
While this temporary wage-base was undoubtedly necessary in the first
" The latitude of the general clause "other relevant circumstances" is evidenced
by the language of the Board in Decision No. 2 (July 20, 192o) : ". . . . the act
provides the Board shall consider in determining wages "other relevant circum-
stances." This, it understands, comprehends, among other things, the effect the
action of this Board may have on other wages and industries, on production
generally, the relation of railroad wages to the aggregate of transportation costs
and requirements for betterments, together with the burden on the entire people
of railroad transportation charges." The above statement is repeated verbatim in
Decision No. 1O74 (June io, 1922).
" The wages of the United States Railroad Administration were fixed by
General Order 27, issued May 25, 1918. This schedule was based upon the
findings of the Lane Commission, appointed by Director-General of Railroads
McAdoo, January i, i918, for the purpose of investigating railway wages. The
commission filed its report April 20, 1918. See testimony of William G. McAdoo,
4 Hearings before Senate Interstate Commerce Committee, Railroad Revenues and
Expenses, 1766-1788 (Feb. I, 1922).
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general wage case, owing to the brevity of time,7 and the complexity of
issues, the same basis was absorbed into the general wage cases decided
by the Board in 192177 and 1922.78 The point to be emphasized in this
continuance of the emergency schedule is that it is a demonstration of
the inability or unwillingness of the Labor Board to initiate and apply
independent and original premises in the adjudication of wages. The
old order is continued, resulting in the preservation of the compromises
and split-evens of the periods of strikes and arbitrations. 9 Its accep-
tance has also involved a lack of due consideration of the "inequalities
of increases in wages or of treatment, the result of previous wage orders
or adjustments," as provided in the Transportation Act. 0
The enunciation. of reasoned and deliberate opinions, sustained and
supported by a complete analysis of the evidence and the statement of
the rules and principles applied by the court, is a distinguishing mark
of the common law. This traditional element, Dean Pound tells us,
is by far the most important ingredient of our legal system. In the
absence of legislative precision in the definition of an industrial code
to guide the Railroad Labor Board, the development of a traditional
element is essential in view of its general powers and uncharted area of
operation.8' It is not sufficient for the Railroad Labor Board to
announce that the litigants have submitted a "very voluminous mass
of evidence" and to reach its decision without further reference to this
"mass of evidence" ;82 or that the Board "has considered the seven
"' Decision No. 2 was dated July 20, 192o, about three months after the organi-
zation of the Railroad Labor Board.
Decision No. 147 (June I, 1921).
Decision No. 1O36 (June 5, 1922).
"It is hardly unjust to the railroads to say that they, like other employers,
rarely pay more to their labor than they are forced to, and for this reason, the
widening of the differential between the train-service and other employees must
be attributed not to the diversion of just increases of the latter to the more skilled
group, but to the relatively stronger strategic position of the train-service employees
as a consequence of their highly developed organization." J. N. Stockett, op. cit.
supra note 67, at p. 165.
" See Decision No. 2 (July 20, 192o) where the Board accepts "(in general) the
existing differential between different classes of employees which have come about
in the railroad service and which may be conmidered prima facie to be based upon
good reason." The reading of the subsequent general wage cases does not reveal
any effort by the Board to discover and remedy "inequalities of increase in wages
or of treatment, the result of previous wage orders or adjustments."
' "The first essential is that the Court should deliver considered judgments
explanatory of the principles on which it has proceeded in each individual case.
Merely to award that the claim has not been established or an increase of wages
equal to half the amount claimed is perfectly futile." Sir Lynden Macassey,
op. cit. spra note 55, 75. Cf. Pound, Tl Spirit of the Comnwn Law (1921)
173-184.
'Decision No. 147 (June I, I92I). The hearings in this general wage case
extended from April 18, 1921, to May 16, 1921. See i & 2 Proc. of U. S. Railroad
Labor Board (1921), containing iio7 pages, and exhaustive supplementary briefs
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circumstances suggested by the act" without any accompanying defini-
tion of the results of the "consideration" ;83 or that the Labor Board
"finds it just and reasonable under the law and the evidence" to make
a certain schedule of wages.8 4  A reading of the major decisions of the
Board in the general wage cases fails to disclose any uniform process
or standard. On the contrary, a certain mechanical method of addition
and subtraction is visible with scant attempt to disclose to the public or
the litigants the exact basis for its conclusions. 5 The return to the
give-and-take principle, reminiscent of the days of strikes and arbitra-
tion, is not wholly absent from the rulings of the Board ;"" the atmos-
phere of compromise is still prevalent."
The failure of the Railroad Labor Board to develop the traditional
element by reasoned opinions is more than a formal defect. It increases
the danger of arbitrary action, based upon expediency and the exigen-
cies of the particular case; it weakens the force and virility of the deci-
sions. And finally, and by no means least, it raises the serious questions
whether the advent of the Railroad Labor Board has in fact resulted in
the development of "predetermined premises" or a "known tech-
nique"; and whether the promise of a legal order, in the settlement of
railroad labor disputes, has been attained in practice. It may be that
the primacy of the public interest necessitates the immediate passage of
filed by the carriers and the employees. The presentation of the employees' case,
among other matters, included a consideration of possible economies in railway
management, price movements and railway income, financial mismanagement and
its effect on railroad labor and alleged inefficiencies in railroad operation. See i
ibid. 351-484, 2 ibid. 593-641; for the reply of the carriers see 2 ibid. gig-iio7.
Apart from the validity of the employees' contentions or the sufficiency of the
answers of the railroads, the fact to be emphasized is that, save for the general
reference noted above, Decision No. 147 totally ignores the many issues relating to
wages, raised by the briefs and oral arguments in the case, and omits examination
or analysis of the data filed by the litigants.
"Decision No. 2 (July 20, 1920).
"* Decision No. io36 (June 5, 1922). This was a general wage controversy
between the principal railroads and the Railway Employees' Department, A. F.
of L. (Federated Shop Crafts) et al. Less than three pages, under the title of
"Basis and Analysis of Decision," are required to state the opinion of the majority
members of the Board. Cf. the reasoned opinion of twenty pages filed by the
minority members in this case.
"The undersigned must dissent from a decision which ignores these witnesses,
the human needs of tens of thousands of families, which has given them not one
word of answer. . . . No facts are stated to justify the opinion. The public is
given no basis for understanding the case or forming a judgment." Dissenting
opinion, Decision No. 1O36 (June 5, 1922) 28, 34.
'Decision No. 1074 (June IO, 1922), 12: "Every citizen, including the railroad
employee, should co6perate in a cordial spirit, should bear and forbear, until the
carriers are back on their feet." Cf. note 67, supra.
V "Nothing very exact or scientific is to be found in all this (Decision No. io28).
It means that the (Railroad) Labor Board, like most such bodies, finds itself
compelled to function by a process of more or less haphazard compromise."
WAL ST. JoUR. May 30, 1922.
THE RAILROAD LABOR PROBLEM
an anti-strike law, regardless of this dearth of jural material in the
industrial order; that railroad labor must submit, in the interest of the
public, to a principle of "free judicial decisions" by a government
board. If this is the case, the step must be consciously taken with the
realization that we are abandoning certain fundamental and traditional
ideas of justice in the common law.88
Opposition to the enactment of repressive labor laws at this time
need not result in the pessimistic conclusion that industrial warfare is
above and beyond law, or that the periodical dislocation of industry is a
necessary evil which must be endured by society; nor does it involve the
positive assertion that the anti-strike remedy is, and always will be, a
futile effort to reach the core of industrial disorders. Tempora mutan-
tur. nos et nmutarnur in illis. The time and place of a given legislative
program, however, are weighty factors in spelling out its wisdom,
efficacy and justice. Limiting our problem to the present day and
locality, there are indications that the doubtful value of force and
compulsion in the name of law may be magnified; there are indications
that we are prone to minimize the importance of a preliminary develop-
ment of established principles, and reasoned opinions. May we not
pause to view the developing results of the application of the counter-
idea of industrial co6peration, its accord with the ideals of America, and
its applicability to the instant railroad problem? Is it not in order, at
least, to face and to solve the task of defining, developing and applying
a "known technique" and "predetermined premises" in our industrial
law before stressing the feudal ideas of status and relation?
If classical common-law ideas are deemed sufficient to work out a
solution of present industrial problems, we undoubtedly have them in the
ideas of relation and status. The return to the recognition of slavery
is not necessary; we can reject the status of slavery, quite apart from
constitutional impediments, on the ground that slavery is "an archaic
idea" and that it is abhorrent to the social order of our day. A molli-
fied common-law form of serfdom-based squarely upon the idea of
relation and not status89 _is available for service. The convenient
distinction between 'serf in gross' and 'serf regardant' may be
"As Dean Wigmore expresses it: .... the moment you have general principles
(in industrial law), you have justice in the form of law, as distinguished from
the arbitrary justice of a Turkish Caliph, or from private struggle decided by
force." A New Field for Systematic TAwtice (1915) IO Il. L. Rv. 592.
Salmond says: "In the application of a fixed and predetermined rule, alike for
all and not made for or regarding his own case alone, a man will willingly
acquiesce. But to the 'ipse dixit' of a court, however just or impartial, men are
not so constituted as to afford the same ready obedience and respect." Science of
Legal Method, op. cit. supra note 2, Introd. lxxxi.
"'"In his treatment of the subject Bracton constantly insists on the relativity of
serfdom; serfdom with hin is hardly a status; it is but a relation between two
perso s, serf and lord; as regards his lord the serf as a rule has no rights, but as
regards other persons he has all or nearly all the rights of a free man." I
Pollock and Maitland, op. cit. supra note 3, at p. 398.
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moulded by a process of analogy to fit the relations of the railroad
employees to the public.90
Despite this wealth of common-law material, it is not clear that
America-at this time-is ready to extend the eminently useful ideas
of relation or status to the point of compulsory service. To sum up,
there are five major difficulties, regarded primarily from the public
viewpoint, which raise questions of the propriety, timeliness, policy, and
efficacy of the proposed law to prohibit strikes in railroad employment.
These are (i) the deeply-rooted individualism of the American people,
which has developed a formidable and inherent dislike for governmental
interference with individual action, (2) the limitations of effective
legislative action, which are involved in the attempt to compel and to
control involuntary service by railroad employees, (3) the primitive
stage of industrial law and the lack of principles and standards in
fixing wages and rules of employment, (4) the infinite ramifications of
the anti-strike remedy in the industrial, and even the agricultural order,
and (5) the failure of similar legislation operating in limited areas.
'°Hilaire Belloc, op. cit. supra note 33, 21. This book may be consulted for the
development of its underlying thesis "that modern society .... is tending to reach
a condition of equilibrium by the establishment of compulsory labour legally enfor-
cible upon those who do not own the means of production for the advantage of
those who do." Ibid. 3.
